DOI:10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.1

This double issue of De iurisprudentia et iure publico (Vol. XVI, Nos. 3-4, 2025) presents the revised and written versions of lectures delivered at the International Jurisprudence Conference, held between 16 and 18 October 2025. The volume is not conceived as a mere conference proceeding. It reflects a shared normative stance. Law is treated here not as a neutral technique of governance, but as a fragile normative structure whose legitimacy, purpose, and limits must again be made explicit.

The studies collected in this issue are united by a common concern. They examine what happens when law is displaced by legislation, when sanction becomes self-justifying, when technology challenges human norm-creation, or when constitutional language absorbs political conflict without resolving it. The authors approach these problems from different doctrinal fields, yet all assume that law cannot survive on procedural validity alone.

A Spanish contribution opens the volume with a radical critique of modern statutory legality. It argues that legislation has gradually replaced law by reducing normativity to formal imputation and self-referential will. Law, in this view, risks losing its ontological grounding and becoming a closed system that no longer points beyond itself. The paper sets the theoretical horizon of the issue by questioning whether legality can still serve as a source of legitimacy.

Two contributions focus on the apex of the sanction system. One examines life imprisonment from the perspective of the objectives of punishment, while the other analyses the enforcement of life imprisonment without parole. Together, these studies expose a structural tension between declared penal aims such as prevention, proportionality, and reintegration, and the actual legal and institutional design of the sanction. Punishment appears here as a normative test case. It reveals whether criminal law still operates within its own justificatory framework or merely enforces exclusion.

The issue also includes a philosophical contribution revisiting Aristotle’s account of justice in Book V of the Nicomachean Ethics. Rather than offering a doctrinal reconstruction, the study proposes a method for interpreting political justice that connects Aristotelian ethics, constitutional thought, and the tradition of natural law.

A further group of papers addresses emerging transformations of law. One contribution explores the prospect of machine legislation and raises the question whether automated norm production can preserve responsibility and meaning. Another, authored by a Greek scholar, analyses the constitutionalization of the right to water and shows how basic material needs are transformed into constitutional obligations. Historical and interdisciplinary perspectives further deepen the volume. One contribution examines early modern political theology through the messianic imperial vision of the Spanish Habsburg monarchy, showing how law, symbols, and sovereignty were integrated into a religiously grounded conception of political mission. A study drawing on literary analysis examines cosmic horror and the collapse of natural order, asking what law can offer when the assumption of a stable world disintegrates. Finally, a comparative paper contrasts legal and political constitutionalism and highlights the growing politicization of constitutional structures and reasoning.

The volume as a whole does not aim at synthesis. Its unity lies in its normative sensitivity. Law is presented as something that can fail, harden, or dissolve, and therefore as something that requires constant theoretical vigilance. In this sense, the issue seeks not to close debates but to reopen them.

The International Jurisprudence Conference explicitly aimed to strengthen the participation of Hungarian jurisprudence in international theoretical discourse. This thematic issue reflects that ambition. The dialogue it presents is not derivative but reciprocal. Hungarian and foreign perspectives meet on the assumption of shared responsibility for the future of legal thought.

The editors express their sincere gratitude to all institutions that supported both the conference and this publication. Special thanks are due to the National Research, Development and Innovation Office for its financial support provided under the Science Patronage – Subprogramme 2 (Identifier: 149144), as well as to the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church in Hungary and the Hungarian Association of Law and Political Sciences for their continued commitment to international jurisprudential exchange.

This issue rests on a simple conviction. If law is to remain more than a technical language of power, it must again be treated as a normative problem. The contributions collected here take that task seriously.

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.2

Abstract:

This paper aims to analyze the process of displacement and eventual abrogation of Law in favour of new artificial legal formulas characteristic of statist formal law, which we call legislation. Legislation unfolds as a mechanism of imputation or as a formal attribution with a condition of possibility, detached from the ordering concept of Law originally oriented toward the attainment of the common good. Rather, legislation is structured as a logical and self-referential mechanism presenting a twofold problem: first, it subjects the idea of legitimacy to the legal order, generating artificial and mutable legal ontologies; second, the only exit from the system is another configuration programmed by itself: Law as a performative representation that discretionarily assigns fabricated realities, operating as false legal ontologies that are entirely changeable. Moreover, by logical extension, this condition of possibility must necessarily rest upon the evanescence of the will, identified with freedom. The act is postponed, and in its place the potential triumphs. Within this structure, the will like morality plays a dual role: as the origin of every order or prescription, and as the final receptacle of the mandate, thus shaping a dynamic of power that is invariably personalist. This paper argues the hypothesis that juridical Modernity, in its most entrenched form, has lost the compass of Law, vindicating the urgency of revitalizing Law from its ontological dimension, restoring it to its being and returning its substance. If statist legality scrutinizes existence by presuming itself moral through self-resolution and self-legitimation, Law must stand as the last bastion of freedom, with all its force and dynamism, seeking its legitimacy beyond the ever-changing social and political transformations.

Keywords: Law, legislation, voluntarism, State, Modernity, legality, legitimacy

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.11

Abstract

This study focuses on life imprisonment particularly life imprisonment without the possibility of parole and examines its substantive and penal enforcement objectives. The study analyzes the position of life imprisonment within the system of sanctions through the lens of current Hungarian criminal law and its commentaries, with special attention to the feasibility of achieving special prevention objectives. The paper highlights legislative anomalies and reveals that the objectives and practical execution of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole in several respects contradict the principles declared in the Criminal Code and the Punishment Enforcement Act. The analysis addresses the principle of proportionality and the requirement of legal certainty. The central hypothesis suggests that life imprisonment without the possibility of parole, in its current form, does not fully comply with the stated substantive and penal enforcement objectives, thereby raising the need for legislative revision. The study applies descriptive, comparative, and empirical methods, aiming to assess the coherence of the sanction system and the enforcement of rule-of-law principles.

Keywords:  life imprisonment, LWOP, special prevention, penal objectives

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.31

Abstarct

The text of legislation must be clear and understandable.[1] In addition to many other requirements, the legislator must communicate the normative content he wishes to convey in accordance with these two requirements, which I believe are important and which are also specified in legislation. Legislative activity is in many ways similar to translation, where the translator transfers the message and linguistic content formulated in one language into another language. According to my research hypothesis, the similarity between legislation and translation is evident not only in the activities themselves, but also in the digitization of these activities; the digitization and automation of translation can serve as a model for the transformation of legislation.

In this study, the Integrált Jogalkotási Rendszer is introduced as a consequence of the digitization of legislation in Hungary through legal digitization. The experiences gained during the teaching of the system are also discussed. Furthermore, the architecture of an ideal electronic legislative system is outlined, based on the research findings of the author. The present study continues to follow the path of digitization, formulating ideas related to the automation of legislation. These ideas are again drawn from parallels with the automation of translation. Finally, I will comprise the results of my experiment: Chat GPT was tasked with generating standard text based on three texts of varying complexity, or „prompts,” initially in 2023 and subsequently in 2025. The investigation focused on two key areas: the effectiveness of the task, and the evolution of the final result over the two-year period.

Keywords: legislation, digitalisation, automation, Integrált Jogalkotási Rendszer, Chat GPT.

[1] The legal regulation of legislation consists of multi-level legislation, already in the Legislative Act (Act CXXX. of 2010 on Legislation) the requirement appears that the legislation must have a regulatory content that is clearly understandable for the addressees, the regulation must not be unduly parallel or multi-level. The legislation may not repeat a provision of the Fundamental Law or a provision of a law with which the legislation may not be in conflict under the Fundamental Law. The Decree on the drafting of legislation (IRM Decree 61/2009 (XII. 14.) on the drafting of legislation) further specifies the requirements: draft legislation must be drafted in accordance with the rules of the Hungarian language, in a clear, comprehensible and inconsistent manner.

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.45

Abstract

This presentation examines the right to water through the lens of jurisprudence and constitutional theory. Building on international and comparative jurisprudence, it argues that access to water transcends mere social policy and should be understood as a fundamental constitutional right. In particular, the presentation analyzes how the right to water functions as a precondition for the protection of human dignity and private and family life under the Greek Constitution, while also introducing the concept of “climate resilience of water” as a jurisprudential innovation. This concept captures the state’s responsibility to safeguard water resources not only for present but also for future generations, thus bridging individual rights with collective environmental obligations. The presentation situates this discussion within broader theoretical debates on the justification of constitutional rights, judicial review, and the interaction between domestic and international law. It ultimately argues that explicit constitutional recognition of the right to water could provide a stronger normative framework, clarifying both its ownership regime and principles of provision. In doing so, it contributes to the jurisprudential debate on how constitutions adapt to global challenges while redefining the scope of fundamental rights

Keywords: Right to Water, Human Dignity, Climate Change, Constitutional Law, Environmental Rights, Climate Change Litigation, Intergenerational Justice.

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.72

Abstract

The Medieval history of the Iberian Peninsula was marked by the Reconquista, the 16th and 17th centuries were marked by the construction of the Spanish Empire, the process of the evangelization of the New World, the struggle against the Ottomans, France and the Protestant Powers. The Spanish Habsburg monarchs inherited and continued the messianic visions of the Catholic Monarchs Isabel of Castile and Ferdinand of Aragon in the Early Modern period. The evangelization of the New World was a messianic mandate given by Pope Alexander VI to the Spanish Crown, the Habsburg rulers considered their kingdoms and subjects not only as countries and nations but as instruments for a higher purpose, to serve God, the Catholic Church, to propagate and to defend the Catholic Faith as well. Among the symbols of their visions, we can find the use of the motto Plus Ultra and the Pillars of Hercules in their royal coat of arms, the use of the titles ‘King of Jerusalem’ or the ‘Catholic Majesty’. They used the Cross of Burgundy, the Cross of Saint Andrew as their imperial flags, not the coat of arms of their countries. The Spanish monarchs were the grand masters of the Spanish Orders of Santiago, Calatrava, Montesa, Alcántara and the Burgundian Order of the Golden Fleece. Their messianic visions were described by themselves in their own testaments and laws.

Keywords: Habsburg, Spanish empire, early modern age, political visions, America, indies

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.72

Abstract

One of the most ancient and enduring issues in the history of legal philosophy is the relationship between law and morality. This can be explained with the fact that the birth of legal philosophy can be traced back to the emergence of philosophy in general. For this reason, for a large period in Western intellectual history, the philosophical analysis of law traditionally implied the assumption that fundamental moral principles and human-made legal rules are related, the former, with a validity beyond human volition, serving as a source of legitimacy for the latter, which are susceptible to change by temporary human will. Thus, one of the main pursuits of classic legal philosophy was to identify the eternal values supplying the foundations of positive law. My paper is an attempt at viewing the “law and morality” question through the lens of the “law and literature” approach. Interdisciplinary movements in legal scholarship like “law and literature” or “law and (popular) culture” offered insight into the various ways literature and other cultural products touch upon problems that are pertinent to how law works or how it is perceived in the popular imagination. From the principles of just distribution to retributive justice and the desire for vengeance to social inequalities, from the greatest literary classics to contemporary popular fiction, a plethora of interactions between fictitious stories and the world of law have been and are being explored to date. My paper focuses on weird fiction and cosmic horror, partly overlapping subgenres of horror fiction pioneered by H. P. Lovecraft (1890-1937). The central motif in cosmic horror is the insignificance of all kinds of human endeavour, and the meaningless world’s indifference towards humanity; an affront to our perception of ourselves as being inherently worthy or possessing some kind of inherent value. My claim is that cosmic horror, by annihilating the teleology attributed to the world by many, implicitly touches on the problem of the destabilization of universal values, a problem that led to the critique and marginalisation of natural law theory by the 19th century. While Lovecraft does not describe situations in which his protagonists face moral dilemmas, he repeatedly hints at an implicit belief in rules and limits inherent in the natural order of things—an assumption not unlike those found in classic natural law theories—and the realization that there is no “cosmic order” is an important writerly tool in his specific brand of horror. This way, cosmic horror offers an opportunity to reflect by the means of fiction upon the fragility of a universal (or any kind of) moral order.

Keywords: law and literature, law and morality, natural law, representation of law,

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.84

Abstract:

This study examines the conditions and practice of enforcing life imprisonment without the possibility of parole (LWOP), with a particular focus on the structural, psychological and security-related challenges faced by the penal system. The defining feature of LWOP is the permanent exclusion of release, which fundamentally alters the traditional purpose of imprisonment and renders the reintegration function largely inapplicable. This shift necessitates a re-evaluation of detention strategies, as a purely custodial approach carries serious risks both for the psychological well-being of prisoners and for institutional security.

The paper outlines the preparatory professional work preceding the introduction of LWOP in Hungary and the early risk assessments identifying persistent hopelessness, depressive states, increased suicide risk and the potential for heightened aggression among this prisoner population. In response to these concerns, the first Long-Term High Security Regime unit (HSR) was established at Szeged Prison. The HSR was designed to combine maximum security with psychological stabilisation, functioning not solely as an isolating measure but as an intermediate and preparatory regime aimed at fostering cooperation and institutional adaptability. Domestic experience demonstrates that prisoners serving LWOP do not constitute a homogeneous group. With appropriate treatment, therapeutic interventions and access to educational and occupational activities, some prisoners may, after a certain period, be integrated into standard prison units. The psychological condition of prisoners serving extremely long sentences evolves dynamically, with phases of resistance, hope and acceptance alternating throughout the prison life course. In this context, isolation cannot be regarded as a permanent solution but rather as a time-limited and professionally justified element within a differentiated regime structure.

By situating the Hungarian practice within the framework of international research, the study highlights that LWOP is frequently experienced by prisoners as a form of the death penalty. The permanent absence of parole, the gradual erosion of personal relationships, prolonged isolation and elevated suicide risk are recurring features of this punishment. The study concludes that the enforcement of LWOP can only be considered compatible with the requirements of a rule-of-law system if security considerations are consistently balanced with safeguards ensuring psychological stability, respect for human dignity and individualized treatment throughout the period of detention.

Keywords: life imprisonment without parole (LWOP), prison system, high security regime (HSR), absence of reintegration

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.96

Abstract

The emerging constitutional court set an obstacle to the policy-making of democracy, and at the same time pushed the political system towards duplication, building the power mechanisms of juristocracy alongside democracy. The basic idea of the need to establish a constitutional court led to the recognition that the provision of cassation power also means interference in democratic processes. The study undertakes a short, sketchy presentation from the role of the ’Das Gericht als negativer Gesetzgeber’ to the intervention close to the positive situation (or from Kelsen to Rawls as preferred).

Keywords: juristocracy, democratic legitimacy, negative legislator, constitutional adjudication

DOI: 10.64608/DIEIP.2025.3-4.104

Abstract

Aristotle’s fifth book of the Nicomachean Ethics offers Aristotle’s most complete treatment of justice. Besides being an invaluable source for understanding Aristotle’s virtue ethics, this account of justice is believed to have considerable bearing on Aristotle’s politics, especially his classification of constitutions, and his potential contribution to a doctrine of natural law. In this paper, I intend to tackle the problematic interpretation of political justice, and in doing so, I wish to engage both with Aristotle’s original text and its different interpretative traditions in proposing a plausible method of assessment. The principal aim of this study is, thus, to sketch out a tenable procedure for interpreting Aristotle’s idea of political justice and accommodating his potential contribution to the doctrine of natural law.

Keywords: Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, justice, natural law